Israel has made regime change in Iran its main strategic objective - opinion

ByEFRAIM INBARNOVEMBER 4, 2026 18:00

Seeking a lasting solution to the Iranian threat, Israel has adopted the ambitious objective of overthrowing the regime in the Islamic Republic.

In the past, Israeli leaders were reluctant to formulate far-reaching strategic goals such as regime change. In its wars, Israel usually attacked its enemies’ military assets to reduce their ability to harm Israeli soldiers and civilians.

There were two exceptions. Bombing raids deep inside Egypt during the War of Attrition (1967-1970) were intended, among other things, to bring down Egypt’s charismatic leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser.

In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon partly to secure the election of Bashir Gemayel as president, the leader of the Christian camp, who was willing to cooperate with Israel against the foreign presence of PLO and Syrian forces in his country. Nasser remained in power, and Gemayel was assassinated shortly after his election.

These failures prompted a more sober assessment of the ability of a small country like Israel to use military force to change a neighboring regime or cause its collapse. Indeed, none of Israel’s national security doctrine papers has ever mentioned regime change, not even the latest, published by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 18.

Regime change a possible war outcome

During the 12 Day War with Iran in June 2025, Netanyahu, who is usually cautious about employing military force, said that regime change was neither a declared nor an official objective, but could be one of the outcomes.

Ultimately, he said, it was a matter for the Iranian people. Echoing messages from the White House, he became more explicit when the United States and Israel jointly launched the war against Iran on February 28. The aim, he said, was to remove the existential threat posed by Iran and create the conditions for Iranians to reclaim their country.

Press reports speculated about a Mossad-planned invasion by Kurdish forces from Iraq to hasten the fall of the regime in Tehran and bring Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s former president, to power. Ahmadinejad hardly represents regime change, and air power is ill-suited to achieving such an objective.

Yet when Netanyahu presented the new national security strategy on October 18, he stated orally that Israel had adopted a policy of regime change in Iran. He added that instructions to that effect had been sent to all security agencies.

Regime change has become the preferred alternative to endless cycles of sabotage and escalation. Israeli leaders seem to have concluded that fighting Iran’s proxies while leaving their sponsor intact is unsustainable, since precise strikes can delay Tehran’s capabilities only temporarily.

Iran’s missile and drone strikes in 2024, which exacted an ever-higher price, reinforced the view that the long-standing threat from Iran and its proxies stems from the regime’s radical ideology, not just its capabilities.

This shift in Israel’s security thinking reflects a new assessment that the Iranian regime is weaker than ever. A severe domestic crisis of legitimacy, grave economic difficulties, increasingly stringent sanctions, a blockade of energy exports, and heavy damage to the regime’s proxies (Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Assad regime) have created a rare opportunity to bring it down.

Intelligence services shared the belief that most Iranians oppose the regime and that many would take to the streets, despite the brutal repression of earlier demonstrations.

The approach is consistent with renewed US maximum pressure and military involvement. The personal chemistry between US President Donald Trump and Netanyahu also appears to have led to US participation in the military campaigns against Iran in 2025 and 2026.

Before Israel’s elections, Trump readily intervened on Netanyahu’s behalf, calling him his best partner for winning the war against Iran. The decision to incorporate Israel into US Central Command (CENTCOM), made during Trump’s first term, eased military coordination, both in defending Israel against Iranian missile barrages and in dividing tasks in the strikes on Iran.

Israel’s experience since October 7, 2023, also contributed to its sense of strength. Successful counterattacks in several theaters and a robust economy encouraged the belief that even a small country dependent on the United States could adopt the ambitious goal of regime change in Iran, provided it coordinated with Washington. And Washington was more disposed to regime change than ever: the United States joined the war against Iran.

Even before the United States bombed Natanz in June 2025, Israeli politicians and strategists were repeatedly declaring that Israel had become a regional power and had transformed the Middle East.

Israel’s war against Hezbollah contributed to the formation of a new government in Lebanon and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, encouraging hopes of a similar outcome in Iran.

During the election campaign, Netanyahu even boasted that Israel could topple the regime in Tehran without American help. Such discourse recalls the euphoria after 1967.

Many Israelis have long argued that nothing could be worse than Iran’s religiously extremist regime. Its collapse would be a clear Israeli victory that could also spur regional realignment and ease some Arab states’ concerns about joining the Abraham Accords.

Jerusalem is not afraid of chaos in Iran, since chaos would give Israel greater freedom of action in locating the 60% enriched uranium and preventing it from falling into the wrong hands. Concerns about the adverse consequences of the regime’s possible collapse, such as soaring oil prices or waves of refugees into neighboring states, carry little weight in Israeli decision-making.

Forcibly eliminating Iran’s nuclear program would send an important message to those seeking a nuclear bomb. Similarly, the fall of a long-established revolutionary theocracy would warn authoritarian regimes everywhere and spur debate about the targeted killing of leaders and about regime change more generally.

As of early November 2026, the Islamist government in Tehran survives. The regime appears weakened but has become even more radical. It may yet fall under continuing US economic and military pressure.

Meanwhile, in the hope that Trump will remain hostile to the Islamist government in Tehran, Israel has adopted regime change as its main strategic objective. As Washington’s junior partner, Israel must recognize that success will depend on sustained US support and on a combination of military, economic, and political pressure.

Regime change probably also requires training opposition forces and conducting limited ground operations. It is also uncertain whether Trump will avoid becoming a lame duck after a new Congress is seated in January 2027.

If the mood in Washington changes, whether because of domestic political dynamics or Iranian diplomatic maneuvering, Israel may find itself alone, facing an Iran more motivated than ever to complete its nuclear project, and with its ability to bring about regime change in Tehran in doubt.

Efraim Inbar is professor emeritus in political studies at Bar-Ilan University, where he served as the founding director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. Inbar is also the founder of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) and currently a senior researcher at JISS.

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