Analysts question Saudi Arabian strategy as Syria denies reports of deployment in region

Debris from intercepted Houthi missiles damaged a Saudi Aramco building in Riyadh on Sunday, November 8, as Saudi Arabia sought additional military support in its renewed confrontation with Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis. Among the possibilities under discussion is a deployment of Syrian soldiers, although conflicting reports and denials from Damascus have left the size and purpose of any mission uncertain.

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Saudi authorities reported limited damage to the Aramco Tower in the capital’s financial district, with no casualties. The attack highlighted the kingdom’s continued vulnerability to Houthi missiles and drones as fighting intensified in Yemen.

In separate interviews with The Media Line, Giuseppe Dentice, an analyst at the Mediterranean Observatory (OSMED) of Italy’s Istituto di Studi Politici San Pio V, and Abdulghani Al-Iryani, a senior researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, offered differing assessments of what Syrian involvement could achieve.

While Dentice identified potential strategic advantages for Damascus and Riyadh, Al-Iryani argued that foreign troops would do little to address the command and leadership problems undermining Saudi-backed Yemeni forces.

On November 8, The Associated Press reported that Syria was preparing to send approximately 600 special forces personnel to Saudi Arabia, citing three officials familiar with the plans. Syrian military advisers were already in the kingdom, but no Syrian fighters had been sent to Yemen, the officials said.

Thousands of Syrian troops may deploy to Saudi Arabia, Yemen

A day earlier, Yemeni military officials told AFP that approximately 3,000 Syrian troops could be deployed to Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Some claimed that hundreds had already arrived, while others suggested that the eventual contingent could reach 10,000 personnel.

Reuters separately reported on November 6 that a limited number of Syrian military advisers and trainers had traveled to Saudi Arabia. Its sources did not confirm a combat deployment.

Damascus rejected reports that Syrian forces were being sent to Yemen. A Syrian diplomatic source quoted by the state news agency SANA said cooperation with Riyadh focused on military training, capacity-building, and the exchange of expertise.

The conflicting accounts followed a defense cooperation agreement signed on November 4 during Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to Riyadh, where he met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The agreement’s detailed provisions have not been publicly disclosed.

For Dentice, the distinction between training and direct participation in combat is crucial.

He questioned what a mission involving thousands of Syrian personnel would entail, particularly if it included experienced fighters rather than conventional military instructors.

In October, Axios reported that Syria’s 84th and 90th Divisions were among the formations being considered for deployment to Yemen. The 84th Division reportedly includes foreign fighters who participated in the campaign against former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Dentice suggested that the backgrounds of some of these personnel could indicate a mission extending beyond military instruction, although no such role has been confirmed.

He also identified possible domestic advantages for al-Sharaa, whose government faces the difficult task of integrating fighters from previously separate armed groups into a centralized military command.

Deploying some of those fighters abroad could ease tensions within Syria’s security establishment while strengthening Damascus’ relationship with Saudi Arabia, he argued.

Closer military cooperation could also open the door to Syria’s participation in the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed in August by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan.

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani said on October 31 that Damascus was evaluating whether to join the pact, which treats an armed attack against one member as an attack against all three.

Al-Iryani, meanwhile, questioned the value of sending Syrian combat forces to Yemen.

“To come as fighters is ridiculous,” he told The Media Line.

Yemen already has large numbers of experienced fighters, he said, and introducing several thousand Syrians would be unlikely to change the course of the conflict.

The underlying problem, according to Al-Iryani, is not a shortage of personnel but the structure of command and control among Saudi-backed Yemeni forces.

“The problem is a question of command and control and leadership,” he said.

Al-Iryani criticized Riyadh for what he described as excessive interference in its Yemeni allies’ military decisions.

Saudi micromanagement demoralizes allies

“The Saudis micromanage their allies, and that, of course, demoralizes them,” he said.

Such interference, he argued, discourages initiative and makes coordination among Yemeni units more difficult.

He contrasted this approach with Iran’s relationship with the Houthis, arguing that Tehran has allowed its allies greater operational independence. In his assessment, that freedom has helped make the Houthis a more effective fighting force.

Changing the composition of Saudi-backed forces without addressing these leadership problems would accomplish little, he maintained.

“No Syrians, no Jordanians, no Americans, no one can solve this. Only the Saudis, by changing the way they manage their allies,” he said.

The debate over Syria’s possible involvement comes as other regional governments consider supporting Saudi Arabia.

On October 26, Egypt’s parliament authorized President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to provide military assistance to defend Saudi territory against Houthi attacks if Riyadh requested help.

Cairo has emphasized that its involvement would be defensive and has not announced plans to conduct ground operations in Yemen.

Dentice described Egypt’s decision as politically significant, particularly given the country’s experience during the North Yemen Civil War in the 1960s, when Egyptian forces became embroiled in a costly military intervention.

He emphasized that parliamentary authorization did not necessarily mean Egyptian troops would be deployed to fight in Yemen.

Syria, meanwhile, could face retaliation if its personnel became directly involved in combat.

Dentice warned that participation in operations against the Houthis could expose Damascus to additional security threats, particularly given Syria’s internal challenges and the continued presence of Iranian-aligned networks.

“It would potentially turn the country into a target,” he said.

Al-Iryani distinguished between foreign assistance intended to defend Saudi territory and the deployment of additional ground troops in Yemen.

Air-defense systems and other specialized capabilities could help Saudi Arabia counter Houthi missiles and drones, he argued. Syrian ground forces, by contrast, would offer limited advantages against an entrenched adversary.

The Houthis have demonstrated their ability to sustain operations despite prolonged bombing campaigns and battlefield pressure. Since fighting resumed in July, the movement has repeatedly attacked Saudi infrastructure while contesting territory along Yemen’s Red Sea coast.

The struggle for control of the Bab el Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, has heightened international concern over commercial shipping and energy transportation.

Houthi advances in September expanded the movement’s influence over the strategic waterway, although Saudi-backed Yemeni forces subsequently reported recapturing several positions nearby.

Fighting has continued around Taiz, where Houthi gains and restrictions on access have threatened government-held territory and disrupted humanitarian supplies.

Al-Iryani argued that the Houthis’ current military pressure is closely connected to their political objectives.

“I don’t think the Houthis want to escalate,” he said.

He believes the movement is seeking to compel Saudi Arabia to return to negotiations and formalize understandings reached during peace discussions in 2023.

Those discussions produced commitments toward a United Nations-backed roadmap that included a nationwide ceasefire, public-sector salary payments, the resumption of oil exports, and an inclusive political process.

Al-Iryani characterized the proposed arrangement as one that could effectively hand Yemen to the Houthis by strengthening their financial resources and political position.

The UN framework did not, however, recognize the Houthis as Yemen’s sole legitimate government. It envisaged a broader political process involving the country’s competing parties.

According to Al-Iryani, Saudi Arabia now regards further concessions that could strengthen the Houthis as a serious threat to its national security.

The renewed fighting has also deepened Yemen’s humanitarian emergency.

On November 7, the Houthi-run Health Ministry reported that airstrikes attributed to Saudi Arabia had killed at least 33 people and wounded 39 in Bani Hushaysh, east of Sanaa. The ministry said women and children were among the victims.

Reuters could not independently verify the allegations, and Saudi authorities said they were investigating.

The International Organization for Migration reported that approximately 310,000 people had been displaced by the renewed fighting as of November 3, with large numbers seeking refuge in Taiz, Lahj, and Aden.

The conflict is unfolding alongside the broader confrontation involving Iran, the United States, and Israel, raising concerns that further escalation could draw additional countries into the fighting.

Dentice considers renewed American and Israeli air operations against Iran more plausible than a large-scale ground invasion. He also raised the possibility of a broader Saudi-led operation against the Houthis, potentially involving foreign personnel.

Al-Iryani anticipates a different trajectory, suggesting that Washington could move toward de-escalation with Tehran following the Democratic Party’s victory in the November 3 US congressional elections.

“I think the de-escalation between Iran and the US is going to start soon,” he said.

He also doubted that additional airstrikes against Houthi positions would produce decisive results.

“The Houthis are dug in, and they can withstand lots of bombing,” he said.

A major escalation involving Iran could nevertheless change the Houthis’ calculations, Al-Iryani warned, increasing the risks to neighboring Gulf states and regional maritime routes.

Dentice placed those concerns within a wider security picture extending from the Persian Gulf through the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa.

He argued that instability involving Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea could interact with the Yemen conflict, threatening maritime commerce and complicating the economic diversification plans of Gulf governments.

For Saudi Arabia, the challenge involves protecting cities and energy infrastructure from missile attacks, preserving access to vital shipping routes, supporting Yemeni allies, and preventing the conflict from drawing additional regional powers into direct confrontation.

Whether Syrian personnel would improve Riyadh’s military position remains uncertain. The size and purpose of any deployment are still disputed, and Damascus continues to deny plans to send troops into Yemen.

Dentice sees potential Syrian involvement as part of a wider realignment of regional security relationships, offering Damascus an opportunity to strengthen ties with Riyadh while managing its own military transition.

Al-Iryani argues that the fundamental problem lies elsewhere. Even a substantially larger foreign contingent, he maintains, would be unable to compensate for weaknesses in the way Saudi Arabia directs its Yemeni partners.

“People say that Houthis defeated Saudi Arabia, but the Houthis did not defeat Saudi Arabia,” he said.

“The ones who defeated Saudi Arabia are the Saudi officials and generals who made it impossible by micromanaging their allies, made it impossible for them to be effective.”