Ireland and Switzerland are having versions of the same debate about neutrality

Until recently, the UN Security Council’s right to veto Irish military engagement in peace operations abroad has not had the effect of inhibiting any such missions. It is largely a theoretical constraint – a reassuring domestic symbol of the triple lock enacted through the Nice Treaty to restrain notionally warmongering governments, supposedly hell-bent on diluting neutrality.

Now, however, the Government’s contentious desire to undo the provision, which allows the US or Russia to determine our deployment of more than 12 soldiers abroad, is coming into conflict with pressing new geopolitical realities.

On the one hand, the increasingly dysfunctional and gridlocked Security Council – which is hamstrung by permanent members’ vetoes – has proved unable to approve any new peacekeeping missions in 12 years.

That reality will unfortunately see the termination in December of the near-50-year Unifil mission to Lebanon, at the behest of the US and Israel. Ireland is still contributing large contingents to the mission – 300 today – which continues to play an important role, albeit imperfectly, in constraining both Israel and Hizbullah. As a disappointed Minister for Defence, Helen McEntee, warns, “What we’re seeing here is exactly what we are seeing happening in Gaza when you have nobody on the ground able to monitor.”

On the other hand, there is the new European reality of war in Ukraine instigated by Security Council member Russia. European solidarity with a prospective EU member is expected, and indeed required, by the Nice and subsequent EU treaties’ obligations to mutual defence.

EU militarisation has not been driven by what some supporters of the triple lock characterise as “military adventurism” or imperialist land grabs, but by the need to enhance its capacity to defend itself against external threat, much like the ongoing revamp of the Defence Forces.

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Other traditional neutrals – if not Ireland – have seen Europe’s ability to defend itself as a vital corollary to noninvolvement in military alliances. Austria is building up its defences, and all the European neutrals, for entirely practical reasons of self-preservation, have engaged in profound re-examinations of the various meanings and necessity of “neutrality”. Finland and Sweden both now eschew the term and have signed up to Nato.

From an Irish perspective, the Swiss – champions of neutrality since 1515 – are a particularly interesting case. Still determined to cling strongly to “armed neutrality”, the Swiss nevertheless rejected overwhelmingly (70 per cent voted no) a “safeguard Swiss neutrality” referendum initiative. Proposed by the country’s far-right Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and a billionaire backer, last month’s referendum to amend the constitution was opposed by the government and the other political parties.

If it had been approved, Switzerland’s neutrality would have been interpreted more strictly, specifically requiring any sanctions by it against Russia to be approved by the UN. Their very own triple lock, no less.

“It’s not a vote against neutrality – neutrality is very supported – it’s about what neutrality means,” said Fabio Wasserfallen, a professor of European politics at the University of Bern, closely echoing arguments against the triple lock in the Dáil.

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Switzerland’s permanent neutrality is recognised in international law, but Bern retains discretion over how it applies its broader neutrality policy – and ultimately has the sovereign right to alter or abandon that status. It participated in economic sanctions against Iraq in 1990 and joined Nato’s Partnership for Peace in 1996. While it is barred from taking part in wars between states or providing military support, the Swiss government can decide whether to impose economic sanctions or co-operate with military alliances without joining them.

The Irish Government aspires to retain a similar sovereign discretion.

Swiss voters face another neutrality question in November when they will be asked whether the country should be allowed to export weapons to a defined group of 25 countries, even if they are involved in ongoing conflict.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and escalating hybrid operations on European soil have reshaped Switzerland’s security calculus. The country has been forced to confront what neutrality means in practice. Bern is also strengthening its defences, boosting military spending and expanding co-operation with European partners.

The Ukraine war poses another interesting, as-yet-theoretical, challenge for Ireland. Any potential peace deal will necessarily involve robust “security guarantees” for Ukraine, understood to mean the presence of substantial international peace-monitoring forces in the country. Russia insists on no foreign troops on Ukrainian soil, and, even if it signs a peace deal, is most unlikely to approve a UN mandate for such forces.

Would Ireland assist in what would probably be a domestically popular mission? Would we be willing to allow the triple lock to block our involvement? And would Mary Lou McDonald, who told the Dáil that “over my dead body will my son be deployed to fight an imperialist war of aggression on any people”, be prepared to acknowledge that defending the Ukrainian people might be somewhat different?