PROJECT COAST: Peace-driven science rises from the ashes of apartheid-era bioterrorism

South Africa signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the first multilateral treaty to ban an entire class of weapons, on 10 April 1972, and ratified it in November 1975.

More than 50 years later, and as concerns mount about the use of chemical and possible use of biological weapons in what has become known as grey warfare in Ukraine and elsewhere, it is an appropriate time to reflect on the rise and decline of the biological weapons programme in South Africa – the only country in Africa to develop both biological and nuclear capabilities.

There are profound lessons to be learnt about how to – and how not to – govern the dismantling of high-consequence programmes such as these. In this six-part series, we focus on the biological programmes that went by the benign name of Project Coast, a covert endeavour that collectively represents some of the worst practices when it comes to building and dismantling a biological weapons programme responsibly.

 Read parts one, two, three, four and five of the series here.

With Project Coast’s records destroyed or missing, researchers estimate that its lead officer, Wouter Basson, led a team of about 20 scientists and 145 employees at the height of its operations. He recruited and carefully selected his science team largely from Afrikaans-language universities, was a persuasive and skilled manager, and put allegiance to a racial killing programme ahead of his ethical obligations as a physician.

Basson and his team besmirched the reputation of South African science and medicine and in their actions joined that special coterie of individuals who have no qualms of conscience in practicing irresponsible and injurious science. 

The pushback, though, has been strong and persistent. The Health Professions Council of South Africa, to its everlasting credit, went to great lengths to hold Basson to account for his ethical breaches and in doing so affirmed the moral purpose of medical practice, which is to advance health and save lives.

Moreover, a great deal of good has happened in the world of biosecurity, nonproliferation and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) compliance since the monstrous activities associated with Project Coast.

Internationally, the South African Permanent Mission in Geneva, currently led by Ambassador Zaheer Laher, has actively and diligently managed the country’s BTWC compliance, disarmament and related multilateral engagements. 

The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (Dirco) has reliably filed confidence-building measures since 1993, leveraging Project Coast rollback achievements – messy as it was – as a bridgebuilder between Western countries and the Non-Aligned Movement. 

Dirco has consistently advocated for the introduction of a legally binding BTWC verification mechanism, one of the most difficult and complex gaps to fill in the current architecture. 

Domestically, biosecurity and non-proliferation compliance is anchored in the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1993, passed under late President FW de Klerk’s watch. The Act is administered by the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, located in the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC) currently led by Melanie Reddiar. 

A critical flaw

According to the Gates Foundation-supported 2026 Africa Health Security Index (AHSIndex), a critical flaw in South Africa’s governance framework is the lack of a dedicated statutory body to oversee dual-use research of concern (Durc). While universities maintain strong self-governing protocols, this oversight falls short because hospital, law enforcement and private-sector laboratories remain exempt. Consequently, pressure is mounting on the DTIC to enact legislation providing comprehensive national Durc oversight across all public and commercial laboratories and biobanks.

The Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf), a parliamentary-funded body promoting the public understanding of science and technology, actively engages with the research community through webinars, open-access repositories and policy discussions to raise awareness about biosecurity hazards and the challenge of Durc. 

The convergence between Artificial Intelligence and synthetic biology escalated the stakes, prompting ASSAf to increase its work in this domain. Led by Glenda Gray, ASSAf recently convened a webinar with the Mirror Biology Dialogue Fund on the long-horizon risks posed by research on mirror life and the possible building of reverse chirality self-replicating bacterial organisms for which there may be no defences in nature.

The AHSIndex also revealed that South Africa lacks the necessary systems, technology, and trained personnel to manage cross-border non-proliferation and biosecurity risks with its neighbours – including Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, and Eswatini.

Addressing these vulnerabilities requires harmonised systems for the safe, secure and traceable handling of biological samples throughout their lifecycle. Achieving seamless cross-border transport will demand close multisectoral coordination across public health, veterinary services, customs, law enforcement, transport, and environmental agencies.

Led by Brown University and the University of the Witwatersrand, an effort is under way to support building a cross-border non-proliferation and biosecurity regime for not only South Africa but the entire Southern African Development Community (SADC) region and its 16 member states.

Leveraging South Africa’s record as the best-performing country in biosecurity among the African Union’s 54 member states, as recently revealed by the AHSIndex, and as the only country in Africa with a fully operational Biosafety Level 4 (BSL4) high-containment laboratory (located at the National Institute for Communicable Diseases campus in Sandringham), South Africa is well placed, if the government makes the right investments, to be a leader in this domain.

Zoonotic disease

Finally, biosecurity is a one-health business and veterinarians play a central role in managing biosecurity and biosafety systems for zoonotic disease, the main source of novel pathogens that spark outbreaks with epidemic and pandemic potential.  

Serving as a member of Parliament in South Africa between 2009 and 2017, I had the great pleasure during oversight visits to laboratories of meeting the distinguished virologist and veterinarian Janusz Paweska, head of the country’s BSL4 laboratory at the time, and an unsung hero of pandemic prevention and response. 

He and his colleagues working with domestic animals on farms and wildlife in South Africa’s parks keep the country safe, despite the fact that the legendary animal health laboratories at Onderstepoort have suffered from serial government under-investment over the years, something that should be remedied as a matter of urgency.

Advancing biosurveillance, biosecurity and non-proliferation requires experts like Paweska. South Africa’s universities have produced their fair share of experts over time, from its physiology, medicine and chemistry  Nobel Laureates to our modern-day scientists such as Rachel Chikwamba, Glenda Gray, Salim Abdool Karim, Shabir Madhi, Misheck Mulumba, Patrick Mwanza, Tulio de Oliveira, Helen Rees, Lizeka Tandwa, Marietjie Venter, and many more. 

Their contributions to advancing health and saving lives overwhelm and hopefully obliterate the reputational damage to South African science caused by Wouter Basson and his apartheid-era state bioterrorists. South Africans who admire Basson and attended his recent sold-out lecture in Pretoria should be ashamed of themselves. DM

Wilmot James, a former MP (South Africa), is a professor at the School of Public Health, senior adviser to the Pandemic Center and director of the Africa Initiative at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island. Andrea Uhlig is a research associate and Brendan Beng was a 2025 and 2026 summer intern at the Pandemic Center. 

The writers are grateful to Razie Salie of the Nelson Mandela Foundation and Jessica Saunders of the Churchill Archives Center, Cambridge University, for their archival assistance.