LOCAL ELECTIONS 2026: Politicians’ egos and ideological hang-ups no longer win votes in SA

If you want to simultaneously entertain and traumatise Zimbabweans, you just have to pull out a file of Muzendaisms, the doings and sayings of the late vice-­president Simon Muzenda. Once a highly respected veteran of the liberation struggle, he spent the post-independence years as Robert Mugabe’s consigliere and vicious political enforcer.

His oratorial wit and skills endeared him to Zanu-PF supporters, but his reckless utterances and mangling of English also made him an easy target for ridicule.

Among the most famous Muzendaisms occurred during the 2000 parliamentary elections, when he went to Chivi in Masvingo province to instil discipline in the ranks. Zanu-PF parliamentarians in various constituencies were rebelling against the leadership after being overlooked as candidates. Some of them had decided to stand as independents, sparking fear in the leadership that they could actually win against party-­endorsed candidates.

Muzenda descended on Chivi with an intention to whip this rural community into line, planning a large rally. The candidates instructed their supporters to boycott the rally, which was eventually attended by fewer than 1,000 people.

Even those who attended were forced by their traditional leaders to do so and the audience was therefore less than enthusiastic. But that did not deter Muzenda from delivering the message that their votes belonged to Zanu-PF, regardless of what their own preferences might be.

“Even if we put a baboon [as a candidate] in Chivi, if you are Zanu-PF you vote for that baboon,” he thundered.

Disdain for voters

In the 2026 local government elections in Zimbabwe’s neighbour to the south, the Muzenda role has been played by none other than ANC national chairperson Gwede Mantashe, whose series of gaffes on the election trail betrayed the ANC’s attitude to its loyal supporters.

In his now infamous remarks to journalists in the aftermath of the ANC’s disastrous outing, he managed to insult urban voters by implying that they were greedy and entitled, and rural voters by characterising them as stupid and accepting of their condition.

“I normally campaign in rural areas. I enjoy it because it gives you results. People there are genuine, what you see is what you get… In the cities you must do more. When you give them a house, they say, ‘But there’s no electricity, we won’t vote for you.’ You give them electricity, they say there’s no water, it’s not consistent, they don’t vote for you,” Mantashe explained, as the ANC reeled from the cataclysmic losses in the metros and cities.

He came in for a lot of stick, but in typical Mantashe fashion it was water off a duck’s back, as he is one of the party’s untouchables. He can spew as much vote-costing puke as he likes and nothing will happen.

What is more important about Mantashe’s latest comments is that they reflect what the ANC has thought of its voters for the longest time. Despite shrinking majorities since 2014, there was always this narrative that “our people” would return to the party. All it needed to do was to “renew” itself and promise, once again, to govern better.

President Cyril Ramaphosa continued this theme when he addressed the ANC’s final Siyanqoba rally in KuGompo City, proclaiming: “There are those who think they are educated, who tell us about surveys that show them the ANC will collapse. There is no truth to that.”

Well, history decided otherwise. The ANC did collapse in the metros and secondary cities. True to Mantashe’s expectations, rural voters loyally stuck to the party they know, but they are also increasingly finding solace in other arms.

What voters want

In the immediate aftermath, the focus of all our attention is rightly on the potential outcomes of the arm ­wrestling over who controls coalition governments in the municipalities that ended up with hung councils.

Against the wishes of the voters, the leaders of political parties are still focused on their egos and ideological hang-ups. This is a profound error on their part. Those holding on to narrow ideological positions are still misunderstanding that this was fundamentally an issues-based election in which South Africans demanded governance.

Voters crossed party lines, backed newcomers and even disavowed identity politics when they went to the polling stations. They were sending a clear message that the next five years in local government must be about good governance, service delivery and a rejection of corruption.

There was one massive exception to this. The voters of KwaZulu-Natal chose to embrace a party that comprises some of the worst elements of the ANC’s bad governance, non-delivery and corruption. But let us not be disparaging about the choices of the majority of voters in that province, a portion of Mpumalanga and Gauteng, and a smattering in other provinces.

Most of those who voted for the chaotic party led by South Africa’s most corruptible politician also made what they believe was a rational choice. They rejected a party that had left them in the doldrums.

For virtually all the parties, the negotiations are being done not just with stable governance in mind, but with what it means for each of them in the two and a half years ahead of the 2029 general election. For some, the calculation is about paths to growth; for others, it is about mere survival.

ANC

Most in the leadership of the erstwhile political colossus are not myopic like Mantashe. They recognise the existential crisis facing their party should it be reduced to a mainly rural force. The ANC does not have Zanu-PF’s culture, inclination or wherewithal to force clinging on to power, and it has accepted its decline over several election cycles.

A further complication for the ANC is that even that rural vote is not guaranteed. In KwaZulu-Natal, it belongs to the IFP and MK, and in provinces other than the Eastern Cape, it is peeling away to upstart parties that reflect local dynamics.

So, the party has to reimagine itself and work out how to retain what remains of its remaining middle-class and urban working-class base, never mind the enormous task of clawing back what it has lost.

DA

The DA has set itself the ambitious target of emerging as the biggest party in the country after 2029. To achieve this, it would need to break out of its comfort zone, where it was virtually reliant on the white vote and could count on Indian and col­oured support.

It has been buoyed by the results of the local government elections, which showed encouraging inroads into predominantly African townships where the ANC once held sway. But it was not alone in benefiting from the wave of anti-ANC sentiment, with ActionSA and some emergent formations also eating from the party’s plate.

If the DA is to capitalise on the 2026 gains, it will have to visibly and tangibly live up to its mantra of governing better, should it get the mayoral chains or other responsibilities. More critically, it will have to work on its optics. Fielding a predominantly pale front row will only be able to take it so far.

And it is not as if there is a shortage of black leadership to propel to the front without exercising tokenism. The DA’s claim to be “the most non-racial party” in South Africa has to be borne out by the extent to which it begins to look like the country.

It may delude itself that these results prove that race is a non-factor, but it should not mistake voters’ defection to the party as a permanent feature. Legitimacy will require effort on the demographic front.

MK

Former president Jacob Zuma is in obvious decline. Whether or not he is around in 2029 is a moot point. He is a shadow of the man who campaigned for the then newly formed MK party in 2024. Zuma’s absence from the campaign trail for much of this year does not seem to have hurt MK, as the anti-ANC momentum in the places where it garnered support in 2024 was already overwhelming.

For all his gargantuan failings and the mayhem in the party, the Zuma brand is still powerful among his loyal supporters. Although this was a boon for MK’s first three years of life, it will become a liability as he becomes feebler. His son Duduzane, the anointed successor, is better suited to providing content for social media creators and stand-up comedians.

The party has the potential for growth, but its impact on the South African scene over the next few years will be spawning a whole plethora of splinter forces viciously hostile to one another. The ANC will try to entice some of these factions back into its arms, but the appeal just won’t be there. The KwaZulu-Natal ballot paper will be a lot more interesting in 2029.

ActionSA

The party, led by entrepreneur and former Joburg mayor Herman Mashaba, stormed onto the political scene with 16.1% in Johannesburg, 8.6% in Tshwane and 6.6% in Ekurhuleni in 2021. It was a performance that shocked even the party leadership. By the 2024 national elections, the numbers for these metros had dropped to 6.2%, 3.8% and 2.4%, respectively. It seemed as if voter excitement was over and it was set to go the way of Cope.

But its strategists conjured a remarkable turnaround. In 2026, it scored nearly 23% in Tshwane, more than 16% in Johannesburg and more than 18% in Ekurhuleni.

If you were an ANC strategist and looking at the electorate, this is the party you would most be concerned about, as it now has the ability to take chunks of its base. ActionSA would not by any stretch of the imagination be called democratic, but it has managed to decentralise its personality profile beyond Mashaba.

It now has other personalities who channel its message and if it secures more prominent roles, it will be able to spread this more widely. It has also shed its Gauteng-centric focus, pulling performances in several provinces. The only part of the country that still seems an uphill reach is KwaZulu-Natal.

EFF

Party leader Julius Malema has done the opposite of Mashaba. Thirteen years after the EFF’s formation and 12 years after it thundered into Parliament and the provincial legislatures, it still revolves around Malema’s personality. The impact of losing leading figures was evident in the 2026 results, with it dropping from 10.31% in 2021 to 6.22%.

It can be said with certainty that this is a party on a downward trend and will be a bit player come 2029.

IFP

Elected IFP leader in 2019, Velenkosini Hlabisa had to live under the shadow of the party’s larger-than-life founder Mangosuthu Buthelezi for most of his presidency. Even though Buthelezi died in 2023, his imagery still loomed large in the 2024 general election campaign material.

That election was meant to be a big step on the IFP’s recovery path, after it benefited from Zuma no longer being president of the ANC during the local government elections three years earlier. But Zuma came back to spoil the party, with MK devastating the ANC and stalling the IFP’s comeback.

Nonetheless, Hlabisa’s enhanced national profile and Thami Ntuli’s role as KwaZulu-Natal premier saved the IFP from the annihilation suffered by the ANC in the province. Its vote share may have fallen, but it held on to most of its majorities in the northern KwaZulu-Natal heartland.

A leadership challenge by the more dynamic Ntuli next year at the delayed national conference may inject the energy that many in the party find lacking in Hlabisa and may help it pick up some spoils from the coming MK fallout.

PA

The PA carried its 2021 momentum into the 2024 general election. It used a combination of appealing to coloured grievances while tapping into growing anti-immigrant feeling in broader society. Its leader, Gayton McKenzie, has used his ebullient personality to hog attention through his sport, arts and culture ministerial portfolio.

More was expected from the PA in these elections, with expectations that it would be the major factor in dragging the DA below 50% in Cape Town. However, its performance can largely be described as static. After ActionSA stole the raw anti-immigrant card, the PA’s path to growth in African communities is limited.

SACP

Contesting these elections was a major gamble for the SACP leadership. The debutant surprised itself and its foes by performing as well as some of the other more established smaller parties. A 2.38% national share of the vote, as well as 271 council seats, is nothing to be sniffed at on your first outing and on a minuscule budget.

The party is now positioning itself as the leader of the left, becoming an amplifier of the voice of grassroots organisations in elected forums. There is no turning back for the SACP and it has pledged that it is definitely contesting 2029.

Rise Mzansi, Bosa and Good

These three parties had planned to contest the 2026 elections as a collective, but differences saw Bosa pull out of the arrangement. After lukewarm performances in these elections, there will be some tough questions on their longevity beyond 2029.

Rise Mzansi and Bosa did well in 2024 and their representatives have punched above their weight in Parliament and provincial legislatures. The challenge now is translating this effectiveness and visibility into horses that voters can bet on in 2029. DM

This story first appeared in our weekly DM168 newspaper, available countrywide for R39. The e-edition of Daily Maverick’s weekly newspaper, DM168, is now free for readers who are signed into their Daily Maverick account. Click here to access the latest e-edition.