ByMICHAEL J SALAMON, LOUIS LIBINNOVEMBER 22, 2026 04:18

Last week, more than 50 people gathered at a private home in New York City for an aliyah program. The organizers never publicly disclosed the time or location. Security concerns made secrecy necessary.

Yet hours before the event, the local police precinct contacted the organizers to say officers would be stationed outside. By the time guests arrived, barricades were in place, a SWAT team was present, and the street had been closed to vehicle traffic.

The police understood the risk and acted before they were asked. That should reassure New Yorkโ€™s Jews. It should also disturb them.

This is what Jewish life in America has become: even a private gathering about moving to Israel may require secrecy, barricades, and armed protection.

Against this backdrop, Mayor Zohran Mamdani announced on November 16 that the NYPDโ€™s Strategic Response Group would be disbanded.

New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani speaks, September 14, 2026; illustrative (credit: ANGELA WEISS / AFP via Getty Images, ANGELA WEISS / AFP via Getty Images)

The roughly 500-officer unit has handled rapid deployment, crowd control, and support for counterterrorism operations. Its officers will remain in the department, and some responsibilities will move to the Intelligence and Counterterrorism Bureau.

Other duties will be divided among separate police units and a new civilian-led protest initiative focused on communication and de-escalation.

Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch allegedly supports the plan and says it will not weaken public safety. Perhaps she is right. But Jewish New Yorkers should demand evidence, not assurances.

The concern is not whether the NYPD can produce a sensible organizational chart. It is what happens on a crowded street when a protest turns violent.

Who takes command when demonstrators outside a synagogue begin pushing through barricades? At what point does responsibility shift from a protest-management team to a counterterrorism unit?

Who has the authority to deploy specialized officers? How quickly can they arrive?

An incident can change character in seconds. A protest can become a riot. A riot can conceal an organized attack. Even a short delay can turn a situation police might have contained into one they can only investigate afterward.

Separating responsibilities does not necessarily make the city less safe. Confusion does. When several units share overlapping duties, every officer must know who is in charge and when authority transfers.

Those procedures must be written, practiced, and tested before an emergency โ€“ not improvised while frightened families shelter behind locked synagogue doors.

New York has already seen how quickly such confrontations can escalate.

On May 5, demonstrators gathered outside Manhattanโ€™s Park East Synagogue during an event involving Israeli real estate. A Hezbollah flag appeared in the crowd.

Protesters clashed with police and attempted to move past barricades. Officers, including members of the Strategic Response Group, maintained the perimeter. The synagogue remained secure.

Imagine the same scene under an uncertain chain of command. Crowd-management officers are waiting for instructions. Civilian mediators are trying to continue a dialogue.

Counterterrorism personnel have not yet been activated. Then someone produces a weapon or a group rushes the police line.

A perimeter is more than metal barricades and uniforms; it is a promise that someone has authority, officers know their roles, and help can arrive immediately.

For Jewish New Yorkers, this is not an abstract concern.

According to NYPD figures, 279 confirmed anti-Jewish hate crimes occurred during the first 10 months of 2026, accounting for 52.6% of all confirmed hate crimes citywide.

Jews make up roughly 1/10 of New Yorkโ€™s population, yet they were the targets in more than half the confirmed cases.

At a moment like this, every decision affecting security at synagogues, schools, and Jewish community centers deserves intense scrutiny.

Mamdani argues that peaceful protesters should not be treated as terrorists. On that point, he is right. The right to protest is indispensable, and officers must be held accountable when they use excessive force.

But peaceful protesters are not the issue. The issue is what happens when peaceful protest ends.

Will NY Jews be safe?

The right to demonstrate does not include the right to threaten worshipers, storm barricades, or terrorize a congregation. Dialogue may prevent a confrontation, and skilled mediators can play a useful role. They cannot replace immediate police authority when negotiation fails.

A frightened child inside a synagogue does not need a debate over which department owns the incident. That child needs the police line to hold.

Mamdaniโ€™s political motivation is hardly a mystery.

Disbanding this specialized police unit was a campaign promise, strongly supported by activists who viewed aggressive police responses to demonstrations as a greater concern than the dangers those demonstrations might sometimes present.

He has now delivered on that promise.

But for Jewish New Yorkers who must walk past hostile crowds simply to enter a synagogue, this raises a more disturbing question: Whose safety is the mayor prioritizing?

Protesters have received a sweeping change in police policy, new limits on crowd control, and an administration determined to protect their right to demonstrate.

Jewish worshipers, meanwhile, are being asked to trust that their protection will not be compromised.

Mamdani insists these goals are compatible. They may be. Protecting civil liberties and preserving an immediate, disciplined response to violence should not conflict.

But until he demonstrates that the new system can respond without hesitation or confusion, Jewish New Yorkers have every reason to question whether protecting them carries the same political urgency as protecting the protesters outside their doors.

Mamdaniโ€™s relationship with New Yorkโ€™s Jewish community cannot be separated from this decision. A mayor cannot ask a community facing extraordinary levels of hatred to judge him only by his language of inclusion.

Jewish New Yorkers will judge him by whether his administration protects them.

By presenting the abolition of the Strategic Response Group as a campaign achievement before its replacement has demonstrated equal or greater effectiveness, Mamdani has given Jews another reason to question whether their security is truly his priority. Whatever his intentions, he has not yet earned their confidence.

There is a straightforward way for City Hall to address these fears.

Publish the emergency command structure. Explain which unit leads when a demonstration outside a house of worship becomes violent. State who can summon specialized officers and how quickly they can arrive.

Conduct realistic exercises involving simultaneous protest, riot, and terrorism scenarios. Release meaningful findings and consult the Jewish security organizations that protect communal institutions every day.

If the new system is stronger, prove it. If officials do not yet know where its weaknesses are, they should admit that before New Yorkers discover them during a crisis.

For generations, New York offered Jews something rare: the chance to build a future without constantly looking over their shoulders. That promise feels less secure today.

Armed guards, locked doors, surveillance cameras, and police patrols have become ordinary features of Jewish communal life. These measures are not products of paranoia. They are responses to experience.

Jewish New Yorkers should not accept this reorganization on faith. They should demand clear procedures, measurable response standards, and public evidence that officers will retain the training, equipment, and authority needed to confront violence.

Mamdani may view this change as a victory for police reform. Families entering a synagogue will use a simpler measure: If danger comes, will help arrive quickly, and will the people arriving know who is in charge?

When windows shatter, there will be no time for another press conference. When the call for help goes out, there will be no time to redraw an organizational chart.

Dr. Michael J. Salamon is a psychologist specializing in trauma, abuse, and the psychology of terror, and is the director of ADC Psychological Services in Netanya and Hewlett, NY.

Louis Libin is an expert in military strategies, wireless innovation, emergency communications, and cybersecurity, and is an adjunct professor at the US War College.

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Source: The Jerusalem Post ยท MICHAEL J SALAMON, LOUIS LIBIN

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