For a decade, the Yemen civil war was treated as a regional issue, confined to the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. But as escalations in 2024-2025 and this year have made clear, the conflict now directly affects the whole world, disrupting global trade and navigation and impacting the strategic interests of every major power.
The Houthis’ ability, with Iranian backing, to endanger maritime transit through the Bab al-Mandeb strait, one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors, is not an isolated military development.
It resulted directly from the collapse of Yemeni state institutions, the dwindling international support for the legitimate government, the proliferation of armed factions and the conflicting regional agendas.
As the past few months have demonstrated, the security of navigation cannot be restored with aircraft carriers and naval task forces alone. A long-term solution necessitates first recognising and then addressing the root causes of the Yemen crisis.
The international community, now facing the consequences of Houthi attacks on commercial vessels, did almost nothing to prevent Yemen’s disintegration. Some of its actions even contributed to the Houthis’ seizure of Sanaa in September 2014.
The Houthi coup marked a decisive turning point, ending the post-2011 transition and opening the way for a parallel armed authority with its own political project that controls strategic territory, including the approaches to Bab al-Mandeb and the highlands overlooking the Red Sea.
Most dangerously, the Houthis inherited the residual capabilities of a state whose military was once ranked the fifth most heavily armed in the Arab world.
This combination of territorial control, inherited state and military capacity, and external sponsorship has made the Houthi threat more serious and more durable than that ever posed by ISIS or al-Qaeda.
And yet, the international community has not treated the Houthis as seriously as it did ISIS and al-Qaeda, nor has it placed the restoration of Yemeni national institutions as top priority. It has approached the Houthis as a force that could be contained, negotiated with, or instrumentalised.
Instead of defending the Yemeni state, the international community settled for temporary understandings and political pressure. One example is the 2018 Stockholm Agreement on the strategic port city of Hodeidah, which secured a ceasefire, mutual redeployment, and UN-supervised security and financial arrangements directing port revenues to the Central Bank rather than to the Houthis. Yet, the deal entrenched the Houthis as the de facto authority over the port and the city as a whole, leaving the power imbalance tilted in their favour; it is highly unpopular among anti-Houthi forces.
In 2021, the Houthis managed to solidify their grip on Hodeidah governorate after the inexplicable withdrawal of the Joint Forces on the Western Coast, a coalition of forces fighting on the side of the internationally recognised Yemeni government.
Neither the Joint Forces nor the regional coalition supporting them had notified the Yemeni government or the UN of their movements; civilians in these areas were told 24 hours prior, which did not give them enough time to evacuate.
The episode exposed not just the failure of the Stockholm Agreement – something acknowledged by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen – but also the failure of the anti-Houthi front, which faced multiple military decision-making centres, inadequate coordination with the government and growing contradictions within the regional coalition.
Rather than building a national army under the legitimate government through the defence ministry, the coalition allowed numerous local formations to emerge outside the state’s chain of command. This was reflected in the Emirati backing for the separatist Southern Transitional Council and Saudi Arabia’s divergent priorities.
By empowering armed formations that refuse to submit to the very state they claim to restore, Yemen’s backers left the anti-Houthi camp divided, allowing the Houthis to consolidate their gains and avoid a decisive confrontation with a united Yemeni army.
As a result, today, the region and the world face a militia that has captured a state and is armed with drones, ballistic and potentially hypersonic missiles. It is controlling coastline beside a major waterway and is using geography as an instrument of pressure and blackmail.
The international response has been a military deployment at sea. However sophisticated, naval deployments and maritime operations may intercept missiles but cannot deliver a lasting solution, since they leave untouched the conditions that allow an armed group to launch attacks from Yemeni territory.
Treating the Houthi threat as a discrete maritime problem addresses only its symptoms while leaving its causes in place. Red Sea security cannot be separated from the security of the states that border it.
Yemen has nearly 2,500km of coastline along the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, and overlooks Bab al-Mandeb. Any serious strategy must treat Yemen’s crisis as one of state, sovereignty and institutions rather than a contest between rival parties.
That requires restoring the primacy of the national-state project, supporting legitimate institutions, unifying military and security forces under a single national command, ending the multiplicity of power centres, and reaching a political settlement only after armed groups, represented by the Houthis, have been broken and defeated, so that a stable state becomes possible.
All Gulf states, including the UAE, must recognise that their own security and stability depend on restoring the Yemeni state and supporting its military and security institutions. Accommodating or empowering armed groups, such as the Houthis and the Southern Transitional Council, can only fuel instability.
The international community too must recognise that restoring the Yemeni state is not a purely Yemeni concern. It is in the strategic interest of the whole world.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
Source: Al Jazeera English · Nabil Al-Bukairi
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