Richard D. Fisher, Jr. On Taiwan: Winning the two space races

There are two space races that the democracies must win: one to deter military campaigns near Earth, and the other to secure positional deterrence on the Moon and beyond.

The good news is that the US is engaged in both races, which will also benefit US allies and partners in Asia, including Taiwan.

On Sept. 14, US Air Force Secretary Troy Meink disclosed, “...the US now has on-orbit space control weapons capable of defending the Joint Force against hostile adversary action.”

No details about these “space control weapons” have yet been disclosed. However, a graphic apparently issued by French Space Command and posted on Sept. 16 on the “X” platform notes that the US, China and Russia possess anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, jamming capabilities, and satellites capable of proximity operations.

China and Russia understand that the US relies heavily on space-based surveillance, intelligence and communications to ensure its military success on Earth, including in the Taiwan Strait. Now they know that the US can defend those assets and retaliate, which could help deter war in space and on Earth.

On Sept. 15, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun (郭嘉昆) stated, “We urge the US to stop expanding its military presence and preparing for war in outer space.”

State-run newspaper the Global Times that same day added, “China has no intention of initiating a space arms race and remains committed to the peaceful use and exploration of outer space.”

Yet during an Oct. 8 debate in the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee, Dr. Christopher Yeaw, US Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, noted:

“China’s hypocrisy on weapons in space is also noteworthy, since China has counter-space weapons in orbit today and has been placing them in orbit for many years. The US was just the first to be transparent about our deployment as a responsible military power...”

The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began demonstrating military space-combat capabilities with ground-based laser ASAT weapons in 2006, followed by its January 2007 destruction of a weather satellite with an ASAT rocket.

Subsequent demonstrations included satellite rendezvous and maneuvering (2010), robotic-arm grappling (2013), advanced maneuvering in geostationary Earth orbit (2016), and satellite capture and relocation (2022).

China could send modules equipped for attack or defense to its Tiangong space station and will send more weapons into Earth orbit as it advances development of a national missile defense system.

In 2021, China tested an orbital, potentially nuclear-armed Fractional Orbital Bombardment system, while since 2024 the US has suspected that Russia has placed a nuclear weapon in space to threaten US satellite mega-constellations.

Potential US space-combat operations will involve the US Space Command, assisted by the US Space Force, both established in 2019.

US President Donald Trump’s 2025 plan to build a “Golden Dome” national missile defense system will also include space-based antimissile and sensor systems that could also be used to help defend US allies and partners in Asia.

In 2022, US allies Japan, South Korea and Australia established military “space commands” that are potential partners in deterring conflict in space.

The second space race is for the Moon and beyond. China and the US are competing to establish positional deterrence in the Earth-Moon system, while the military character of China’s space expansion is illustrated by its astronauts’ membership in the “PLA Astronaut Brigade.”

In 2021, China and Russia formed the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), a largely China-dominated lunar coalition that now has 13 member nations. The CCP’s influence was strengthened by the 2023 formation of the International Lunar Research Station Cooperation Organization (ILRSCO), which has 60 percent membership overlap with the China-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

This matters because the legal regime governing the Moon remains largely unsettled. ILRSCO could be expected to defend Chinese actions that appear to conflict with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which China signed in 1983, or the 1979 Moon Agreement, which prohibits “military bases” and “military maneuvers” on the Moon but which China has not signed.

As early as 2016, the South China Morning Post reported China was funding research into a large, 50-meter lunar radar that could monitor cislunar space between Earth and the Moon.

Other Chinese academics have proposed space stations at the cislunar Earth-Moon L-1 Lagrange point, suggesting the potential for a PLA “toll booth” controlling access to the Moon.

China is also using its space program to cultivate partners and advance its goal of “unification.”

It is training two Pakistani astronaut candidates, one of whom is expected to visit its Tiangong space station. Two European astronauts completed Chinese astronaut survival training in 2017, although the program was halted in 2023 for lack of funding.

In October 2022, China opened astronaut candidacy to citizens of Macau, and former Hong Kong police officer Lai Ka-ying (黎家盈) boarded Tiangong in May 2026.

Earlier, in February 2013, Taiwanese former vice president Lien Chan (連戰), a two-time Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate, visited China and met three astronauts from its Shenzhou-9 mission. Although China did not publicly invite astronaut candidates from Taiwan, the meeting could be interpreted as an implicit invitation.

China may begin sending astronauts to the Moon in 2029 or 2030 as it tests its Long March-10 manned lunar launch vehicle and Lanyue manned lunar lander. An initial crewed ILRS lunar base, including a nuclear power plant, is planned for the mid-2030s.

But in August 2023, a symposium hosted by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) revealed that CASC had spent three years developing a 100-year plan to extend China’s presence throughout the solar system — in effect, extending CCP power.

Fortunately for the free world, Trump revived the US crewed lunar program in December 2017, following former US president Barack Obama’s 2010 cancellation of former US president George W. Bush’s “Constellation” lunar program.

Obama explained that day, “We are no longer racing against an adversary.”

In 2020, the Trump administration formulated the Artemis Accords, under which signatories commit to principles including peaceful and transparent exploration, rendering assistance to others, avoiding harmful interference, and protecting historic sites.

The accords began with eight signatories and attracted a total of 76 by the end of September 2026.

This is a significant diplomatic achievement: nearly 40 percent of the world’s countries now agree on basic principles for lunar behavior, creating a powerful political incentive for China and Russia to respect them.

But the Moon lacks a formal, enforceable legal regime; building a presence will therefore be necessary to establish lunar precedents.

This helps explain why Trump directed NASA in early 2026 to accelerate its lunar program to return Americans to the Moon before he leaves office.

On March 24, NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman announced NASA’s “Ignition” program, a US$30 billion initiative encompassing 79 launches for lunar missions, 72 lunar landings, up to 24 crewed lunar landings, lunar nuclear power plants, a 10-satellite lunar constellation, two large crewed launch vehicles, and two crewed lunar landing vehicles.

Japan is funding a large pressurized lunar rover that could enable two Japanese astronauts to reach the Moon as early as 2033. Italy’s US$5 billion investment in a multipurpose habitat could enable two Italian astronauts to arrive by 2033 or 2034.

India, another important Artemis Accords signatory, is also pursuing independent lunar capabilities. Its Chandrayaan-3 probe landed on the Moon in August 2023, and it aspires to send astronauts there in the 2040s.

Taiwan is already a US space partner. The US launched Taiwan’s first satellite in 1999, and eight of Taiwan’s current nine satellites have been launched aboard SpaceX rockets.

It is in the US’ interest for Taiwan to develop its next generation of high-resolution optical and radar surveillance satellites. Washington should also help Taiwan develop a larger, more survivable satellite communications capability to strengthen deterrence against PLA attacks and reduce vulnerability to attacks on undersea communications cables.

Taiwan helped develop a computer used on the International Space Station, was selected by NASA in 2016 to help develop an uncrewed lunar probe that was never funded, and developed electronics used in NASA’s 2021 Perseverance Mars rover.

Taiwan, therefore, is able to contribute to future lunar programs through private-sector partnerships or cooperation with the US government.

Finally, Trump’s August 28, 2026, executive order calling for a United States Space Academy aims to “prepare the next generation of astronauts, scientists, engineers, operators, entrepreneurs, civil servants and warfighters.”

The academy should eventually welcome personnel from US allies and partners, including Taiwan, helping develop the skilled cadre needed for their future space programs.

Winning both space races will require more than American military capabilities and lunar missions. It will require a coalition of democracies able to deter aggression near Earth, establish a sustained presence on the Moon, and prevent China from translating its growing space capabilities into strategic dominance.

Richard D. Fisher, Jr. is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center.