Political theater or not, Netanyahu and Eisenkot both need unity talks to look real - analysis

ByHERB KEINONNOVEMBER 15, 2026 20:41Updated: NOVEMBER 15, 2026 20:42

Negotiating teams from Likud and Yashar met for the first time Sunday afternoon. While it is not clear whether this is nothing but political theater, one thing is certain: neither party can afford to leave this particular stage.

Why? Because neither Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu nor Yashar leader Gadi Eisenkot wants to be blamed for torpedoing something much of the country seems to want.

Neither wants to be cast as the man who stood in the way of unity. In other words, they both want this to look real.

Netanyahu and Eisenkot may be nowhere near agreement on who should lead the next government, what its composition should be or how it would address the issues that divide them. But neither wants to be seen as the man standing in the way of unity.

That explained Netanyahu’s video statement Saturday night calling on Eisenkot to enter negotiations without preconditions.

The most intriguing part of the statement was what Netanyahu did not say.

Netanyahu did not insist, as he has in previous calls for unity, that he must head the government. He did not say that he must serve first in a rotation. He simply called for the parties to sit down and talk.

That omission was telling, creating an impression of flexibility without requiring Netanyahu to concede anything concrete.

The prime minister still has not uttered the word “rotation” or offered it to Eisenkot. But by leaving the question open, he could present himself as the leader extending his hand – and place the burden on Eisenkot to explain why he would not take it.

Eisenkot immediately dismissed the appeal as “another spin” but stressed talks with the Likud were already scheduled.

Why Eisenkot sent Yoav Horowitz to the Likud talks

Likud and Yashar’s negotiating teams, he pointed out, had arranged to meet on Sunday. He also named the two men he was sending to the meeting, MK Chili Tropper and Yoav Horowitz.

Horowitz, who served from 2016 to 2019 as Netanyahu’s chief of staff and has since become an acerbic critic of the prime minister and his family, was a telling choice.

He knows from experience how Netanyahu bargains, and his appointment sends a message to Likud: if Netanyahu tries to leave himself a loophole in the deal, Horowitz knows how to close it.

While characterizing Netanyhau’s appeal for unity and announcement of talks that were already scheduled as “spin,” Eisenkot was also careful to make clear that he did not reject the talks. He did not want to be accused of walking away from what much of the public wants to see.

And this is why the talks should be viewed on two levels.

On one level, they are coalition negotiations that could, theoretically, produce a broad government. On the other, they are a struggle over who will be blamed if no such government emerges.

The political incentives are obvious.

Netanyahu does not want to appear to be putting his continued tenure ahead of national unity, particularly after losing his parliamentary majority. He needs to demonstrate that he is willing to broaden the government at a moment of deep security and diplomatic uncertainty.

Eisenkot, meanwhile, cannot campaign as the responsible, statesmanlike alternative to Netanyahu and then refuse to negotiate with the Likud. He must show that his opposition is to Netanyahu’s continued rule, not to unity itself or to the more than 1.2 million Israelis who voted Likud.

In any event, the public argument for unity remains strong. Israel is still actively engaged on several military fronts; it is unclear what will happen with Iran, and it is facing a different Washington landscape following the Democrats’ midterm gains.

Netanyahu can invoke those challenges to argue that this is no time for a narrow government dependent on Arab-party support. Eisenkot can invoke the same challenges to argue that this is no time for a caretaker prime minister who has lost his majority to make far-reaching decisions.

Each can therefore present unity as necessary – and the other as the obstacle. A new Likud MK is asking both sides to show what they’re willing to give up to make it happen.

Elisha Medan’s unity tent raises pressure on both sides

Last week, when Elisha Medan was sworn in, MKs across the chamber rose to applaud him. Madan, who lost both legs fighting in Gaza, is emerging already as one of the figures in the new Knesset capable of eliciting admiration across political lines. On Saturday night, Medan set up a “unity tent” outside the Knesset.

Medan’s move gives the unity initiative a strong moral force that will be difficult to dismiss. Indeed, Eisenkot called on Medan to be among the Likud negotiators.

Ultimately, Medan’s unity tent could prove politically insignificant – a moving gesture that attracts visitors and headlines but does not alter the negotiations. Yet it could impact the atmosphere surrounding the negotiations.

Medan can’t bridge the central dispute between Likud and Yashar over who serves as prime minister.

Nor can his moral authority erase the parties’ disagreements over issues such as Netanyahu himself, a state commission of inquiry into October 7, or haredi (ultra-Orthodox) conscription.

But as a symbol of sacrifice for the country, his intervention may raise the political cost of letting those disagreements end the talks.

Eisenkot’s three paths to a governing majority

Medan’s tent may make it publicly harder for Eisenkot to walk away from talks with Likud. In any event, the underwhelming 48 seats in Eisenkot’s own bloc give him a reason to negotiate with the Likud – his other options are problematic.

To form a government, he must find additional support from one of three places: the Arab parties, the haredi parties, or Likud.

Each route carries a heavy political price.

Relying on the Arab parties, even from outside the coalition, would provoke opposition within Yashar and B’Yachad and almost certainly drive Yisrael Beytenu’s Avigdor Liberman away.

Bringing in the haredi parties would require a compromise on military service that could contradict one of Eisenkot’s four governing principles and alienate voters who supported the change bloc precisely because it promised universal service.

That leaves the Likud. But a Likud without Netanyahu – which would be Eisenkot’s dream – is not currently on offer, while Likud under Netanyahu is the government Eisenkot was elected to replace.

This is why Eisenkot is exploring all three tracks at once. Talks with Likud demonstrate openness to unity. Contacts with the haredim offer a potential path to a Jewish majority without Netanyahu.

Netanyahu’s strategy for the coalition talks

Continued parliamentary cooperation with the Arab parties, which is expected to lead to the election of a new Knesset speaker this week, gives Eisenkot control of the Knesset and leverage over everyone else.

Netanyahu is also working on several tracks, though he has fewer cards than Eisenkot. He is warning the haredi parties not to defect, delegitimizing a government supported by the Arab parties, and extending a hand to Eisenkot to join a broad Jewish coalition.

His objective is clear: make any government that doesn’t include the Likud appear unstable, illegitimate, or dangerous.
So – political theater or not – these unity talks serve the political purpose of both men.

For Netanyahu, they put Eisenkot in the position of having to explain why he would turn down a broad government; for Eisenkot, they keep open a path to a majority and enable him to say that – if unity falls through – it wasn’t because he didn’t try.

This is not to say that what is taking place is necessarily fake. Both men have reason to show voters they’re willing to talk. They may find themselves willing to compromise once their other options start to look worse.

Eisenkot may discover that neither the haredi nor Arab route can produce a viable government. Netanyahu may conclude that sharing or temporarily relinquishing power is preferable to losing it altogether.

And Medan’s tent may help transform the public demand for unity from an abstract sentiment into political pressure that neither leader can easily ignore.

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