Opinion | West Side Stories: As Rabat Deepens Ties with Tel Aviv, Algiers Breaks with Abu Dhabi

When Nicolas Sarkozy, then president of France, visited Tangier on 23 October 2007 to promote his proposed Union for the Mediterranean, he invoked Morocco’s history of protecting Jewish communities as an example of the shared heritage that could underpin Mediterranean cooperation. “Throughout Europe, Jews were being persecuted, while here in Morocco, they were protected,” he said, pointing to a history that remains central to understanding Morocco’s culture and regional policies.

Nearly two decades later, as Gaza, Yemen and Iran dominate international headlines, three interconnected developments further west warrant attention: Morocco’s move from normalisation with Israel to a strategic partnership, Algeria’s rupture with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the deepening rivalry between Rabat and Algiers. Together, they are reshaping the Western Sahara dispute, competition across the Sahel, the Arab Maghreb Union’s stagnation, the future of the western Mediterranean’s 5+5 Dialogue and the Arab League’s search for a common response to regional challenges.

For Egypt, the significance lies in how these shifts could affect the security of its western approaches and the wider neighbourhood. As Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso navigate competing offers of security assistance, investment and economic connectivity, the consequences of North Africa’s political divisions reach into Libya, Chad and Sudan. To protect its national security, Egypt needs to encourage a regional order in which the quest for military superiority and economic dominance do not deepen existing divisions.

On 16 September 2026, Morocco and Israel agreed to upgrade their diplomatic missions to full embassies, appoint ambassadors, expand air travel and pursue high-level visits and economic agreements covering investment protection and double taxation. The announcement marked a further stage in relations formally restored under the Abraham Accords in December 2020.

For Rabat, normalisation was closely linked to Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara under the Trump administration. Israel recognised Morocco’s claim in July 2023. The relationship has since offered Morocco closer ties with Washington, valuable diplomatic support on its principal territorial dispute and access to advanced defence technology. For Israel, Morocco provides a strategically positioned North African partner, a promising defence market and a convenient platform for expanding commercial and diplomatic influence across Africa.

The military dimension has become increasingly prominent. A defence cooperation memorandum signed in November 2021 established a framework for military sales, intelligence cooperation, training and industrial collaboration. At the Marrakech Airshow in October 2026, Israel’s Ministry of Defence opened its first official national pavilion at a Moroccan defence exhibition, presenting loitering munitions, autonomous navigation systems, robotic platforms and satellite communications.

Morocco’s military modernisation extends beyond Israel. It draws on American, European, Turkish and Israeli suppliers, having begun receiving Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones in 2021. Moroccan media reported in June 2026 that Turkish-made Bayraktar Akıncı combat drones had entered service. Israeli cooperation adds a focus on technology transfer and domestic production, including reported plans for armoured-vehicle components associated with Israeli defence firm Elbit Systems.

These developments also concern Spain. Morocco claims Ceuta and Melilla, which Madrid considers integral parts of Spanish territory. Although Spain retains substantial conventional military and alliance advantages, advances in Moroccan surveillance and unmanned systems could influence assessments of security in the western Mediterranean. In September 2026, Spanish broadcaster RTVE reported that a drone operating in Moroccan airspace interfered with a commercial aircraft’s landing manoeuvre near Melilla airport. The following month, Reuters reported that Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez confirmed Moroccan naval vessels had entered Spanish waters near Ceuta after a mass crossing of migrants in July. Sánchez described the incidents as isolated while emphasising continued cooperation. Madrid’s dilemma reflects a wider regional reality: Morocco remains an important partner in migration management and regional security even as territorial disputes and military modernisation complicate relations.

Western Sahara is central to the rivalry between Rabat and Algiers. Morocco controls most of the disputed territory and advocates autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The Polisario Front seeks self-determination, including independence, and receives Algerian support. The dispute remains unresolved under the United Nations framework. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, proclaimed by the Polisario Front, joined the Organisation of African Unity in 1982, before becoming a member of the African Union. African governments remain divided between support for Sahrawi self-determination and backing for Morocco’s autonomy proposal. European governments are also divided although support for Morocco’s proposal has grown in recent years.

The UAE’s opening of a consulate in Laayoune in November 2020 marked a significant diplomatic endorsement of Morocco’s position on Western Sahara. For Algeria, which backs the Polisario Front and rejects Moroccan sovereignty over the territory, such moves reinforce concerns about the growing alignment between Rabat and Abu Dhabi. For Morocco, Western Sahara is a matter of territorial integrity and national identity. For Algeria, support for the Polisario Front reflects its deep-rooted belief in the struggle against occupation as well as its longstanding rivalry with Rabat. Morocco’s diplomatic gains and expanding defence partnerships have sharpened Algerian concerns about the shift in regional balance.

The dispute has frozen the Arab Maghreb Union’s activities, established in 1989 to promote integration among Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania. Its inability to function effectively has deprived North Africa of a framework for addressing shared economic and security challenges. A political settlement over Western Sahara would remove one of the region’s most persistent sources of division. At the same time, its absence continues to shape how both countries interpret their neighbours’ partnerships.

On 10 September 2026, Algeria severed diplomatic relations with the UAE, accusing Abu Dhabi of persistent provocative and hostile actions. Algiers gave the Emirati ambassador 48 hours to leave and announced restrictions on UAE-registered aircraft, while allowing commercial flights to Algiers to continue until the end of 2026. The UAE expressed hope that the rupture would be temporary.

No single triggering incident was identified. The breakdown followed years of tension over Emirati influence in Africa, particularly in the Sahel. Algeria opposes normalisation with Israel and condemns Abu Dhabi’s support for Morocco’s position on Western Sahara. Algerian officials have openly accused the UAE of interference and attempts to destabilise countries across West Africa.

For Egypt, the implications extend beyond the bilateral dispute. Cairo has an interest in maintaining brotherly relations with both Algeria and the UAE while preventing their differences from undermining cooperation on Libya, Sudan and wider Arab security challenges.

Morocco and Algeria are advancing different approaches to economic connectivity and political influence across the Sahel. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso face insecurity and economic isolation while navigating competing offers of security assistance, investment and infrastructure.

Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative, announced in 2023, aims to provide landlocked Sahelian countries with access to Atlantic trade routes through Moroccan infrastructure and ports. The proposed deep-water port at Dakhla, in Western Sahara, is intended to connect the Sahel and West Africa with international markets. For participating countries, the initiative promises improved access to maritime trade. For Rabat, it strengthens Morocco’s position as a regional gateway while reinforcing its territorial ambitions. Its success depends on financing, construction, security and participating states’ incentives to use the proposed corridors.

Morocco’s Atlantic ambitions build on longstanding ties with the United States. In 1777, Sultan Mohammed III opened Moroccan ports to American ships, and the relationship was formalised by the 1786 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, against a backdrop of threats to American shipping from maritime piracy. This history informs Rabat’s efforts to strengthen its strategic position across the Atlantic and in Africa.

Energy infrastructure offers another arena for competition. The proposed Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline would connect West African producers and markets to Morocco and potentially Europe. Algeria’s Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline envisages a route through Niger. Both projects face substantial financial, construction and security challenges, but their proposed routes reflect competing visions of regional connectivity.

Algeria, meanwhile, has pursued free-trade zones with neighbouring countries and sought to restore its traditional role as a mediator in the Sahel. On 21 October 2026, Algeria signed a new military cooperation agreement with Niger. Relations with Mali have been particularly strained for some time over border security. In March 2025, Algeria shot down a Malian drone, claiming it had violated Algerian airspace. Mali denied the allegation, triggering a diplomatic crisis. Relations were restored in July 2026, followed by a meeting between Malian Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga and Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune in Algiers in August.

Instability across the Sahel can spread through armed groups, illicit economies and displacement, affecting neighbouring states and the wider North African security environment. Developments in Mali and Niger cannot be separated from the challenges facing Burkina Faso, Chad, Sudan and Libya. For Egypt, these pressures connect directly to its western frontier, making engagement with North African and Sahelian governments an important component of national security.

Morocco’s relationship with Israel draws on a distinctive historical connection. Jewish communities in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya developed over centuries, contributing to the region’s religious, linguistic, commercial and cultural life. Their histories included periods of coexistence and cultural exchange, although conditions varied across countries and historical periods. Colonial rule, migration and Israel’s establishment transformed these communities. Morocco has placed particular emphasis on its Jewish heritage as part of its national identity and international diplomacy. Diaspora networks and people of Moroccan Jewish origin have sustained cultural and family connections with Israel, although political views remain diverse.

Agricultural cooperation offers a less visible precedent for the relationship. Following Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel, US-supported programmes brought Egyptian and Israeli scientists together to work on irrigation, arid-land development, crop production and agricultural technology. The Nubaseed demonstration farm, established south of Alexandria in 1987, became a prominent example of this practical cooperation. In 1992, the model was extended to Morocco with US support, despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations. The programme helped develop Morocco’s seedling industry and facilitated collaboration on hybrid vegetable varieties, greenhouse equipment, irrigation materials and agricultural research.

The experience illustrates how technical cooperation can precede political normalisation, creating commercial relationships and institutional networks that later support wider engagement. Today, cooperation in agriculture, water management and technology can advance Moroccan development while extending Israeli commercial influence across Africa.

Egypt’s experience demonstrates the limits of this approach. Practical cooperation under a formal peace treaty has not produced comprehensive normalisation while Palestinians remain under occupation. This distinction is particularly relevant as Morocco deepens its diplomatic, military and commercial ties with Israel amid the Gaza war. Rabat supports Palestinian statehood and humanitarian relief, while King Mohammed VI chairs the Al-Quds Committee of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Nevertheless, the government’s expanding partnership with Israel has drawn criticism from Moroccans who see a contradiction between normalisation and the unresolved Palestinian question. Strategic gains, including closer relations with Washington and access to technology, do not remove the political costs of that contradiction.

For Cairo, three priorities stand out: monitoring North Africa’s changing military balance, strengthening engagement with Sahelian governments to address threats affecting Libya and Egypt’s western approaches and preserving scope for Arab cooperation despite diverging regional alignments.

Morocco is known in Arabic as al-Maghrib al-Aqsa, the Farthest West. Its strategic reach now extends from Atlantic access for the Sahel to the balance of power in the Mediterranean. Algeria seeks to shape the same regional landscape, but their rivalry threatens to leave the Maghreb divided and more vulnerable to outside competition. The next phase of regional geopolitics will not be shaped exclusively by events in the Mashreq. The Maghreb is already part of the story, and Egypt has every reason to look west. The question is whether Rabat and Algiers can keep their competition for regional influence within reasonable limits or whether their separate partnerships will make their estrangement harder to reverse.