Opinion | Ethiopia’s Illusions

Would possessing 12 Su-35 fighter jets and four S-400 air defence batteries be enough for Ethiopia to alter the balance of power in the Horn of Africa or the Red Sea—even if those numbers were doubled? Some may argue that Russia’s direct involvement alone would be sufficient to bring about such a shift.

The reality, however, is considerably more complex. This region is already saturated with foreign military bases, strategic alliances, and security arrangements, owing to its exceptional geostrategic significance and its proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, through which a substantial share of global trade and oil shipments passes.

Djibouti is arguably the country hosting the largest concentration of foreign military bases in the world, owing to its unique location overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. It hosts American, Chinese, French, Japanese, and Italian military bases, as well as European military contingents from Germany and Spain.

Somalia, meanwhile, hosts three military bases operated by the United States, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. In Eritrea, Israel maintains intelligence and electronic surveillance facilities. Moscow has also concluded security agreements and understandings with Asmara concerning the use of facilities at the Port of Massawa. Russia, moreover, relies on an informal military presence and private security contractors, such as the Africa Corps and its predecessor, the Wagner Group, to expand its influence on the ground. These entities have been involved in providing security and military services, as well as training, in Sudan and neighbouring African countries.

As for regional military and security alliances, the African Union and the United Nations provide an institutional framework aimed at supporting the Somali government and combating the Al-Shabaab militant group. This effort involves forces from neighbouring and other African countries, including Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia.

There is also the Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, established through a regional initiative to strengthen cooperation and security among countries bordering the Red Sea. Its membership includes Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea. The council is intended to serve as a framework for political and security coordination in confronting maritime threats and external interference.

On another front, Israeli news outlets have been promoting the argument that this arms acquisition—12 Su-35 fighter jets—is sufficient to constrain Egypt’s ability to launch a strike against the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Yet even if the number of aircraft were increased, the decisive factor would remain not the weapons themselves, but the ability to deploy them effectively and operate them successfully.

According to information cited by specialized military sources, including Global Firepower and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the distance between Egyptian military airbases and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam exceeds approximately 1,500 to 2,000 kilometres. Egypt’s Air Force operates Rafale, MiG-29, and F-16 fighter aircraft, supported by aerial refuelling tankers and long-range air-to-ground weapons, as well as cruise missiles such as the SCALP. These capabilities allow for the launch of missiles from safe stand-off distances, beyond the direct engagement range of air defence systems.

Despite its considerable capabilities, the S-400 system requires full integration with a layered early-warning radar network and a comprehensive air defence architecture encompassing short-, medium-, and long-range systems. It must also be supported by capabilities designed to counter networked missile threats, extremely low-altitude targets, and electronic penetration. The system is by no means an impenetrable shield when operated in isolation or without comprehensive electronic warfare support.

Any carefully planned aerial operation would employ aerial deception, electronic warfare, intensive jamming, and potentially the targeting of military bases and airfields from which Ethiopian fighter aircraft operate, either before or during the operation. Such measures could significantly reduce the effectiveness of those aircraft in intercepting incoming threats.

The Egyptian military establishment possesses decades of experience in developing integrated air defence networks, conducting complex air operations (COMAO), and employing electronic jamming and electronic warfare capabilities. This constitutes a decisive advantage in any tactical or strategic confrontation.

Ultimately, the decisive factor in determining whether such an operation succeeds or fails is not the number of weapons systems Ethiopia possesses. Rather, success depends on the operational scenario, intelligence capabilities, and the degree of integration between electronic warfare and military planning.

Interestingly, according to a report published by the Israeli website NZIV, the aircraft acquired by Ethiopia are Su-35E fighters originally manufactured for Egypt. Cairo had reportedly cancelled the deal after redirecting its procurement strategy toward the more advanced Rafale fighter. Moscow subsequently concluded the agreement with Addis Ababa because it was seeking “ready buyers” for aircraft that had already been manufactured, while also seeking to avoid disrupting production lines allocated to its own armed forces amid the war in Ukraine.

In conclusion, claims that Russia’s arms deal with Ethiopia is capable of fundamentally altering the balance of power in the Horn of Africa or curtailing Egypt’s regional role amount to little more than wishful thinking. The concentration of foreign military bases, the overlapping network of strategic interests, and the extraordinary complexity of the regional landscape make it highly unlikely that 12 fighter jets and four S-400 air defence batteries could single-handedly turn the strategic equation upside down.

The possibilities, therefore, remain largely confined to two scenarios: either Addis Ababa is seeking limited domestic propaganda gains to boost public morale without generating any meaningful strategic impact, or the deal may contribute to a temporary escalation in military tensions without giving Ethiopia the ability to impose a fundamentally new balance of power.

The broader strategic realities, including the major regional power dynamics and established international alliances, remain firmly in place—and are unlikely to be fundamentally altered by arms acquisitions of such limited scale.

Prof. Hatem Sadek, Helwan University