From civil war to political deadlock: the deep roots of Iraqi Kurdistan's KDP-PUK rift

Iraqi Kurdistan’s two dominant political parties are locked in their most serious confrontation in years, raising questions about the future and the possibility of two rival administrations within the semi-autonomous region.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Bafel Talabani, last week withdrew from the Kurdistan Regional Government. The move followed the resumption of parliamentary proceedings in Erbil after two years of political paralysis. The Kurdistan Democratic Party pushed ahead with electing parliament’s leadership despite a boycott by the PUK, which had demanded an agreement over the distribution of senior positions before the session.

The confrontation has revived memories of the 1990s, when the two parties fought a civil war and governed Iraqi Kurdistan through separate administrations. But while the prospect of a renewed division has become a central concern, analysts say the legal and political circumstances are different today. Both parties have much to lose from a formal split, even as their ability to reach a compromise remains uncertain.

Who are the KDP and PUK?

The KDP is the older of the two parties. Founded in 1946, it became the principal political vehicle of the Kurdish national movement under Mustafa Barzani, whose son Masoud Barzani remains its most influential figure and a prominent Kurdish leader.

The party draws most of its support from Erbil and Duhok provinces, where it maintains extensive political, administrative and security networks. The Barzani family remains central to its leadership, with Masoud’s son, Masrour, as Prime Minister, and his nephew, Nechirvan, as President of the Kurdistan Region.

The PUK was established in 1975 by Jalal Talabani, who broke away from the KDP alongside other Kurdish political figures. It developed a different political identity, drawing support from leftist and intellectual circles, particularly in Sulaymaniyah.

Talabani became one of Iraq’s most prominent Kurdish politicians and served as the country’s first president post-US invasion. Current PUK leader Bafel Talabani is his son.

Show caption: Kurdish Democratic Party founder Mustafa Barzani, pictured i…

How did the rivalry begin?

The origins of the split date back to the collapse of the Kurdish uprising in 1975. The KDP, under Mustafa Barzani, had been fighting for greater autonomy from Baghdad. But its position was severely weakened after Iran and Iraq signed the Algiers Agreement in March 1975, ending Tehran’s support for Kurdish fighters.

The two movements developed separate political and military structures, competing for influence over the Kurdish national movement and the territory they hoped to govern.

After the 1991 Gulf War and the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous administration in northern Iraq, the parties initially agreed to share power. Elections held in 1992 produced an almost equal division of parliamentary seats, leading to a power-sharing arrangement.

But disagreements over territory, political authority and the distribution of customs revenue escalated into armed conflict in 1994.

Show caption: PUK leader Jalal Talabani, left, and KDP leader Masoud Barza…

The fighting became a full-scale civil war. The two Kurdish parties continued fighting until a US-brokered agreement in Washington in 1998 ended the civil war.

However, the agreement did not immediately reunite the region's institutions. Iraqi Kurdistan continued to operate through two administrations: one in the KDP-controlled areas of Erbil and Duhok, the other in the PUK-controlled area of Sulaymaniyah.

The two sides formally reunited their administrations in 2006 through a power-sharing agreement, although their political, economic and security structures were never fully integrated. Three years before that, the dynamics in Iraq had fundamentally changed when Saddam Hussein’s regime was toppled.

Why have they struggled to govern together?

The central problem is that the KDP and PUK have never entirely separated their party structures from the institutions of the regional government. Both retain significant influence over public institutions, security forces and economic networks in their respective areas.

The Peshmerga, the Kurdish military forces, are one of the clearest examples. Although successive agreements have sought to bring them under a unified Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, important units have remained affiliated with the two parties.

Internal divisions within the PUK have also shaped the current dispute. In 2021, Bafel Talabani moved against his co-leader and cousin Lahur Jangi Talabani, formally expelling him and consolidating control of the PUK. In August last year, Lahur was arrested after a dramatic operation by PUK-affiliated security forces. The raid on Lalezar Hotel sparked hours of armed clashes that left five people dead. In October this year, a Sulaymaniyah court sentenced Lahur to five years and three months in prison on criminal conspiracy charges.

Mohammed Salih, a non-resident senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a researcher with the Middle East Minorities Institute, said the PUK was seeking to recover its political strength after more than a decade of internal disputes and divisions.

“It appears to see adopting an increasingly confrontational stance towards the KDP as a way to bolster its domestic standing, particularly as it competes with smaller opposition parties for votes in Sulaymaniyah and Halabja,” he told The National.

In addition to the PUK, other parties including the National Stance Movement, the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the New Generation Movement boycotted a parliament session held last week. On Thursday, Masrour Barzani called on all political parties to support the reactivation of parliament, saying: “It was not directed against anyone or any party.”

Could Kurdistan return to two administrations?

That possibility has become one of the most contentious aspects of the dispute, but analysts warn against assuming that a return to the arrangements of the 1990s would be straightforward.

The Iraqi Constitution recognises the Kurdistan Region as an existing federal entity under Article 117. Article 119 sets out procedures through which one or more governorates can organise themselves into a new federal region.

But neither the Constitution nor the 2008 law governing the creation of regions explicitly addresses a situation in which governorates seek to break away from an existing autonomous region.

Mr Salih said that if Sulaymaniyah and Halabja sought to separate from the Kurdistan Region without securing recognition as a distinct federal region, they could be reduced to ordinary provincial administrations, with considerably fewer governing powers.

Halabja, a city in the Sulaymaniyah region that was subjected to a chemical weapon attack in 1988 during Saddam Hussein's rule, was declared Iraq’s 19th province last year to enable it to receive more resources to improve the life of the survivors.

A KDP official told The National: “The federal government officially deals with the Kurdistan Region as one constitutional entity. Its formal division could create wider complications for Iraq's federal system, including renewed debates about establishing regions elsewhere in the country.”

He also highlighted the implications for Baghdad. Allowing a separate region to emerge from within Kurdistan could encourage similar demands in other parts of Iraq, including Basra, Anbar and Mosul.

Winthrop Rodgers, a Chatham House associate fellow and freelance journalist, said the legal and procedural implications of a division remained unclear. He said Article 119 provided a route for governorates to form a new federal region, but any attempt to apply it in this situation would be legally contested.

The KDP official said any attempt to divide the Kurdistan Region would face significant legal obstacles. “I am firmly convinced that such a division will not happen,” he said, adding that this was due to several reasons including the constitutional framework, the will of the people, Baghdad and international dynamics.

“I believe international partners and neighbouring countries recognise that a stable and unified Kurdistan Region better serves regional security, economic co-operation and political stability,” he added.

In an interview for On the Record with Hadley Gamble on Thursday, Bafel Talabani said talk of two separate governments was “jumping the gun”, and completely ruled out violence.

Mr Talabani rejected the idea that the dispute was a family feud between the Talabanis and the Barzanis.

“I think there is a long-standing disagreement between two political powers of the region, and sadly that's come down into the population,” he said. What happened in parliament, he added, “was the straw that finally broke the camel's back”.

Show caption: Iraqi Kurdistan's Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, right, mee…

Who would benefit from a divided Kurdistan?

The consequences would extend beyond the relationship between the two parties. A divided Kurdish leadership would have less influence in Baghdad, where the KDP and PUK have traditionally competed for positions and negotiated over the region's constitutional and financial rights.

The federal government has long been at odds with the KRG over budget transfers, public-sector salaries and the management of oil revenue.

Mr Salih said the current divisions presented “both an opportunity and a major headache for Baghdad”. Some influential political factions in the federal government would welcome a weaker Kurdish leadership, he said, particularly those seeking greater central control over the region.

Baghdad has steadily tightened its authority over the Kurdistan Region through court rulings and financial pressure, including a 2022 decision that declared the KRG’s oil and gas law unconstitutional and demanded that the region hand control of its oil sector to the federal government. A 2024 Federal Supreme Court ruling also required Kurdish public sector salaries to be paid through federal banks, while repeated disputes over budget transfers and oil revenue have left Erbil increasingly dependent on Baghdad.

“A divided Kurdistan Region would leave it less able to defend both the principle of Kurdish self-governance and the legal and constitutional capacities that come with it,” Mr Rodgers told The National.

Baghdad wants control over sovereign responsibilities and financial flows, he said, but does not necessarily want to take over the day-to-day functioning of regional institutions. However, if those institutions stop working, federal authorities could assume greater responsibility.

One example is the possibility of Baghdad paying public sector salaries directly, an idea that has periodically been raised in discussions between the federal government and the KRG.

From a Kurdish perspective, Mr Rodgers said, that would be dangerous because “once those powers are gone, they likely won't come back from the centre”.

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What happens next?

Despite the severity of the confrontation, both parties have incentives to reach a negotiated settlement.

Mr Salih said the PUK's withdrawal from government was reversible and the KDP's decision to reconvene parliament was an attempt to restart a process that had been stalled for almost two years.

He said the way forward should be a new, comprehensive power-sharing agreement that brought the two parties together, improved government and strengthened the Kurdish position in Baghdad.

Mr Rodgers similarly said the parties had strong reasons to find a way forward.

“At the end of the day, they will benefit more from a framework that enables them to co-operate politically, economically, and in terms of security than from being separate,” he said.

He added that ordinary Kurds opposed division, and that leaders could even gain political rewards if they secured a substantive agreement.

But Mr Rodgers said this “doesn't look very likely”. He cited the parties' very different positions, their limited appetite for reconciliation and the absence of effective US mediation.

“The US is uninterested in mediating,” he said, adding that the parties had not listened to Washington anyway.

Tom Barrack, the US envoy to Iraq and Syria, said disputes among the Kurdish leadership needed to be resolved internally. “This is an Iraqi decision; it’s not an American decision,” he said at the Chatham House Iraq Initiative Conference this week.

The KDP said it remained optimistic that an agreement could be reached in the coming weeks or months. The official said the differences between the parties were significant but not impossible to resolve. “What unites us is far stronger than what divides us,” he said.