Commentary: Singapore’s haze law gets sharper teeth. Will it finally bite?

Commentary

Previously, Singapore could act only after its skyline had faded. Now it has the power to do more before the haze arrives, says NUS law researcher Sean D Tseng.

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06 Nov 2026 06:00AM

SINGAPORE: Even as the skies clear, Singapore is turning up the heat after the worst haze episode in more than a decade. 

For most of its existence, the Transboundary Haze Pollution Act (THPA) has remained untested. Since it was enacted in 2014, no one has ever been prosecuted or sued under it. That may change with the conviction demonstrated by the government to act over the last few weeks. 

In this short time, Singapore has served notices under the THPA on 20 companies, summoned the leaders of 10 of them to meet three Cabinet ministers, appointed a specialist investigations panel and agreed on a joint task force with Indonesia. Perhaps most significantly, it put forward extensive amendments to the THPA, which passed in parliament on Wednesday (Nov 4). 

The amendments do not merely sharpen the Act’s teeth; it changes its fundamental character. A law built around proving offences after the fact is being reorganised around preventive action and risk-based enforcement.

Taken together, the new powers represent a step change in its deterrent effect. This means that how proportionately they are wielded will also matter. 

FROM HAZE TO THE RISK OF HAZE

The most consequential change is also the subtlest. Throughout the Bill, “haze pollution in Singapore” becomes haze pollution “or a risk of haze pollution in Singapore”. 

In 2015, and again this year, Singapore could act only once its skyline had already faded. Now, a company commits an offence if it causes or contributes to a fire abroad that merely creates a risk of haze. 

A new presumption infers that risk from smoke moving towards Singapore. The Director-General of Environmental Protection from the National Environmental Agency (NEA) can now also issue a certificate that would serve as conclusive evidence of such risk.

CLOSING THE EVIDENCE GAP

The THPA’s chronic weakness has been evidence. Singapore cannot prosecute if it does not know whom to prosecute.

Indonesian concessions overlap and official maps contradict one another. This situation exacerbates if Jakarta declines to hand over concession maps. 

The Bill’s answer is to give statutory form to the panel of assessors announced last month. The NEA may direct a company to appoint assessors, at its own expense, where it has reason to suspect involvement, including through supply chains or corporate control. 

Assessors can inspect land, demand documents, which could include concession maps from the companies, and report directly to NEA. Obstructing them risks a potentially sizeable fine, and companies can no longer hide behind confidentiality obligations or the privilege against self-incrimination.

The model is not new. Singapore’s exchange regulator can direct listed companies to appoint special auditors and similar probes can arise in money-laundering and sanctions cases. But this appears to be the first time the technique has been turned on environmental harm.

RAISING THE PRICE OF BURNING

The enhancements also count on raising the deterrent effect. Penalties rise tenfold: up to S$1 million (US$0.8 million) a day, capped at S$20 million, plus up to S$500,000 a day for ignoring a preventive measures notice. Courts can also order convicted offenders to surrender any profit gained or loss avoided, disincentivising the “slash-and-burn” gamble to clear land.

Significantly, a new civil penalty of up to S$10 million gives the authorities the option to choose to pursue an action that could succeed on the balance of probabilities. That matters, because the criminal standard of needing to demonstrate an offence was committed beyond reasonable doubt can sometimes set the evidential bar too high for cross-border prosecutions such as these. 

A trial-in-absentia provision closes another gap. If an accused served with a notice to attend court fails to appear, the court may proceed without them, provided they were warned this could happen. 

Companies cannot later have such proceedings set aside. Playing hide and seek with the law is no longer a viable strategy.

THE STRONGEST LEVER

Potentially the most powerful deterrent requires no conviction at all. 

Under new section 8D, the minister may designate an entity, its business partners or those controlling it, where the minister “knows or has reason to suspect” it has committed an offence or is unlikely to comply with a notice. That threshold is ordinarily used for purposes of arrest and carrying out investigations, but is used here to exact financially prejudicial measures on errant companies.

The consequences are severe. Orders include barring anyone from supplying, buying from, lending to or insuring a designated entity. Another subsection goes further, requiring it and its counterparties to terminate existing business arrangements. 

For a company that banks, trades or raises capital through Singapore, this can be financially suffocating. It brings to bear Senior Minister K Shanmugam’s pledge to pull on every lever, including “access to financing”, and reflects Singapore’s leverage as the region’s gateway to finance and commerce.

The law also designates “persons on notice” who must not enter into or continue dealings with offenders. This targets the network around errant companies, making it harder to evade scrutiny simply by reshuffling corporate structures.

POWER, WIELDED WISELY

The case for stronger powers is compelling. Indeed, any one of these measures, in isolation, would be a major step up. 

Taken together, they allow for potentially severe measures before wrongdoing is established. 

Ultimately, it requires these powers be exercised in a calibrated fashion – in view of the strength of the evidence, the company’s degree of involvement, and the urgency of the risk.

The amendments will not catch every culprit; Indeed, there will still be potential gaps in information and enforcement Given Singapore still cannot legislate past its borders or gather evidence on Indonesian soil, there can be no substitute for cooperation with Indonesia.

The joint taskforce agreed in October must therefore be pursued with equal vigour. Announcing its launch, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Arrmanatha Nasir said that “no border should shield those who profit from burning our forests” – a more openly cooperative posture that the two countries have always had reason to share.

THE TEST FOR SHARPER TEETH

Still, will the amended Act deter far more effectively than the 2014 version? Absolutely. 

Any company with Singapore links that is directly or indirectly responsible for fires now has powerful financial reasons to behave responsibly.

Whether the sharper teeth finally bite in court remains to be seen. But the truest test may not require a conviction at all. 

Success lies in changed corporate conduct – and, ultimately, in fewer fires being lit in Indonesia in the years ahead. That is an outcome we will only see in the rear-view mirror.

Sean D Tseng is Senior Adjunct Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Centre for Environmental Law, National University of Singapore.

Source: CNA/ch