Out of Chaos: A Catastrophic History of the Nation State

Author: Jon Wilson

ISBN-13: 9781787335356

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Guideline Price: £25; 336pp

“It is a long business to shuffle out of the mental habits of the… 19th century world”, John Maynard Keynes told an audience at University College Dublin in April 1933; “it is astonishing what a bundle of obsolete habiliments one’s mind drags round even after the centre of consciousness has been shifted”.

Following an imperial World War and in the midst of a worldwide Great Depression, Keynes was telling his Irish audience of a very 20th-century idea, “national self-sufficiency”, arguing that it would lead to the peace and prosperity for which the globe was yearning. Only a third of the way into the 1900s, Keynes argued, was the world finally escaping the mindset of the previous century.

We are today perhaps in a similar position.

The triumph of national self-determination is often seen as natural and inevitable, not least here in Ireland – the result of people across the globe escaping the oppressive rule of empires. From international relations, to sport, to maps, the nation state has become the almost unquestioned defining feature of how our world is ordered. And yet, Jon Wilson writes in this provocative new history, until the 1940s it was seen as an unlikely, impractical, and illogical way of organising societies, emerging only as “a pragmatic response to global catastrophe”.

For all the Allied propaganda about “the rights of small nations”, the world after the first World War remained a “world of empires”, with just a handful of independent nation states. Most of those were either actually empires themselves (such as Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands), self-consciously multinational states (Czechoslovakia, Poland), or still semi-attached to empires (Ireland). Indeed, Keynes’s message to the Free State was that we were not a “large enough unit” to pursue national economic self-sufficiency alone, and should instead seek “an economic arrangement” with Britain and its evolving imperial federation.

In the 1930s “the compact nation state was seen as an impractical chimera”, and Wilson argues that federalism was instead a dominant idea of the interwar world. “That a nationality should constitute a state,” declared the Indian Home Rule League’s petition to the Paris Peace Conference (quoting Lord Acton), “is contrary to the nature of modern civilisation.” Almost all Indian nationalist leaders envisaged a federal independent India, and in post-imperial China and the Soviet Union, too, federalism was central to new forms of government.

Tracing the influence of French legal thinker Léon Duguit across the globe, Wilson shows how, from commonwealths to federations, “many possibilities existed that would have allowed greater self-government while keeping different national communities bound together in a single state”.

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While Wilson’s argument that federalism was “a very real political possibility” is persuasive, subsequent events perhaps show that it may not have been as viable as contemporary thinkers believed.

The Great Depression and the rise of aggressive regional imperialism in Germany and Japan led to the world fragmenting into “a set of complex, often poorly defined, but heavily armed economic zones”, and the second World War would completely shatter the global order. Yet even during the war, the promise of freedom from Nazi and Japanese tyranny was not primarily seen through the lens of new nation states.

Indeed, Wilson shows how the Allied “United Nations” was not originally conceived as a body of nation states at all, but instead a military, political and economic alliance “that merged many functions of [the Allied] imperial states”. The war seemed to be showing that nation states were too small to survive the realities of geopolitics, and the future seemed to be one of “super-states, reformed empires, or federations”.

As strange as it seems in the age of Brexit, “there was nothing peculiar about Winston Churchill’s 1940 proposal to fuse Britain and France together in a single state”. “Nothing,” Wilson writes, “in the constitution of international politics in August 1945 made the division of the world into compact, unitary nation states seem likely.”

And yet that is what happened. Wilson emphasises how even beyond the death toll, the sheer depth of the global catastrophe following the war is impossible to overstate: hundreds of millions displaced, even more starving, and nearly half of the world’s population “living in societies embroiled in some form of civil war”.

Such a collapse of even basic governance left political leaders trying to create a stable post-war order with a crisis of legitimacy, as “war led to the collapse of many states [and] exhausted many others”.

With the collapse of the Axis empires and disintegration of the British and other European empires under financial and political strain, there was little to hold societies together. The federal Soviet Union had been transformed by war and terror into an empire. At the “talking shop” of the United Nations, contradictory ideas of sovereignty and legitimacy were tying the world in knots, with communists, capitalists, imperialists and nationalists unable to agree on anything.

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The response to such chaos was partition into “nation states”. Lines on maps were a way of creating new “national” political units that could at least claim popular legitimacy, and perhaps offer a way out of the impoverished world becoming caught in a vortex of continuing conflict.

“The nation state,” Wilson argues, “was the only form of organisation political leaders from different ideological positions… could agree on to manage the fractured, impoverished postwar world.” In its debates over the 1946 Iran Crisis, the 1947 partitions of Palestine and Kashmir, and the 1948-49 resolution of Dutch decolonisation in Indonesia, the United Nations began to order a world of nation states, not through ideological design, but contingent compromise.

A professor at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, Wilson’s narrative of the partitioning of South and Southeast Asia is particularly illuminating. The creation of Indonesia from “a cluster of interacting but basically separate linguistic and cultural universes” shows the ways in which “basic assumptions about how the world should be organised were transformed”.

In place of federalism and many different political units came a single national regime with a new constructed national language. Across the Indian Ocean, escalating violence and imperial panic led to the partition of India and Pakistan, and the creation of two separate states in place of the federation that most nationalists had predicted and advocated.

Partition, of course, often enlarged or provoked much of the violence and ethnic cleansing it was supposed to stop or prevent, not just in South Asia, but in Africa and the Middle East too, leaving scars that remain open wounds today. But while “the postwar partitioning of the world unfolded gradually”, it offered a new language and conception of global affairs that became swiftly self-justifying. Rival new states (and nations without states at all) rapidly came to agree that “the world was composed of nation states that conformed to a universal, general form”.

Even the old imperial and multi-national states, themselves shrinking into nation states, had to accept the new global framework. “National consciousness,” Harold Macmillan declared in the wake of the Suez Crisis and the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, “is a political fact.”

With protected industries, state planning and a focus on self-sufficiency, nation states sought economic independence as much as political, albeit often with mixed results (not least here in Ireland, which is sadly absent in most of Wilson’s narrative). They also promoted (and often constructed) their own unifying or “supposedly singular” languages, cultures and economies, often starkly in tension with their own more diverse and interconnected histories.

Poland, which actively debated its multinational nature before and during the war, was moved hundreds of kilometres west (“no less a partition” than those in Asia), with an enormous forced movement of ethnic Germans to align population realities with nation-state boundaries – a process repeated across eastern Europe.

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Wilson repeatedly points out how nationalism long predated nation states, and had mostly sought its goals through other political structures until after the second World War. Yet in rightly rejecting the dominant teleology of nations into states, and the myth of the nation state as a 19th-century idea, he perhaps at times underplays how nationalism had changed political expectations and legitimacy even before the postwar crisis.

Minority national cultures and identities within or across these new states were often flattened or erased, and by the 1960s the nation state itself began to face challenges of legitimacy and fragmentation from its minorities, from Biafra to Bangladesh to Belfast. The idea of a “unified” nation also seemed increasingly out of step with social change, economic currents and cultural movements that crossed borders.

The crisis of the 1970s seemed to show the national economy to be an outdated concept. Yet even state responses to it were aimed at strengthening or rescuing the world of nation states, not destroying it. Wilson shows how the authoritarian nationalism and economic “liberalisation” of Park Chung-hee, Ferdinand Marcos, Deng Xiaoping and others was intended to reassert national sovereignty even as the role of the state shifted.

Even the enlarged European Union, often cast by nationalists as the enemy of national independence, created a federal structure through which the small nation state could still thrive in a global economy. But today, the forces of economic globalisation, transcendent technology, mass migration and imperial nationalism all continue to create a perception that the fragile nation state is in crisis.

Yet this accidental construction continues to survive. For all its mythology and contradictions, Wilson writes, it is still “a flexible means to channel people’s aspirations to self-determination in a complex, interdependent world”. It can shift its aims and ambitions to match the political weather, and no major alternative has yet emerged to replace it.

The most important lesson of Wilson’s fascinating history is how global crises create the need for new forms of government, often in unexpected ways. Climate change, AI, pandemics and imperialist war all show the inadequacy of national solutions based on institutions constructed in the 1940s. Forgetting the alternatives to the nation state, and its own forgotten history, leave us unprepared for the crises to come, and the unexpected outcomes they will produce.

Christopher Kissane is a historian and writer, and the host of Ireland’s Edge

Further Reading

The Rise and Fall of the British Nation (Allen Lane, 2018), by David Edgerton Edgerton’s provocative history explores the construction of the postwar British nation state.

They Called it Peace (Princeton, 2024), by Lauren Benton Benton reveals the importance of imperial violence in constructing the international order.

Worldmaking After Empire (Princeton, 2019), by Adom Getachew Getachew shows how decolonisation was much more diverse than a transition from empires to nations.

Source: The Irish Times · Christopher Kissane

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World
Country
🇮🇪 IE
Publisher language
EN
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